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Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

OPERATIONAL DESIGN:

A KEY ELEMENT IN SUCCESSFUL BATTALION LEVEL COUNTERINSURGENCIES

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR G.L. JONES

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Executive Summary

Title: Operational Design: A key element in successful battalion level counterinsurgencies

Author: Major G. L. Jones, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: In order to successfully determine *how* to conduct counter-insurgency operations, infantry battalions, in conjunction with non-military and host nation actors, must conduct Operational Design prior to detailed planning by using doctrinal as well as non-doctrinal methods. These methods are necessary due to the complex nature of modern insurgencies, the interagency effort required to mount a successful counter-insurgency, and often vague information pertaining to the actual nature of the problems in an assigned Area of Operations.

Discussion: In the current, complex, environment of today's counterinsurgencies infantry battalions must conduct elements of Operational Design to adequately determine *how* to solve these problems instead of merely deciding *what* to do in response to an assigned mission via the use of MCPP. Many veterans and observers of the current counter-insurgency in Iraq understand that tactical level units must operate in a non-standard, non-doctrinal, and decentralized fashion. However, much of the effort to ensure tactical level success has focused on *which TTPs* small unit, counterinsurgents should employ and how the military can better *man and equip* companies and squads to do these things. Unfortunately, few have discussed in earnest *how* tactical units should determine *what* to do in the conduct of small unit counterinsurgency. The techniques of Operational Design require introduction to the infantry battalion in order to correct the aforementioned problem. Proper application of the tenets of Operational Design will allow infantry battalions to formulate a better understanding of the "wicked problems" they will confront on the modern battlefield. When dealing with an insurgency the holistic understanding gained through Operational Design will assist the infantry battalion in formulating the actions that will negate, not exacerbate the causes of the insurgency. MCPP is not suited for this purpose. Operational Design, used as a precursory step to MCPP, will allow infantry battalions to properly frame the problem and determine broad objectives and concepts of action to address the problem. The distillation of the problem into these broad concepts should provide MCPP with the detailed inputs is supposed to receive (i.e. - a mission statement). Targeting and assessment methodology, generally conducted at the level of the infantry division, also requires introduction to the infantry battalion. Targeting methodology can provide infantry battalions with a method to allocate the diverse assets available in modern counterinsurgencies. Instruction pertaining to assessment, a critical aspect of Operational Design, will provide the infantry battalion with a formal method to learn about the actions they take and facilitate a re-design of their campaign plan.

Conclusion: Operational Design is currently in use in Iraq by infantry battalions and regiments in an attempt to better understand their complex environment. These same units are also using targeting and assessment methodologies. While infantry battalions may not create an actual "Campaign Plan" by the current standards defined in doctrinal publications, they are developing conceptual plans that allow them to better frame the problem and determine viable solutions via detailed planning to the counter the insurgents they face.

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DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

Preface

The following thesis is a result of the author's 21 months of combat experience in Iraq as an Assistant Operations Officer, Company Commander, and Operations Officer. Unfortunately, I spent many of these months attempting to determine the required actions needed to adequately counter the insurgency I faced. Fortunately, during my last deployment I was able to determine a better way to combat an insurgency. My experience as the Operations Officer of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines from August 2007 to March 2008 exposed me to the benefits of Operational Design. During this deployment, I came to understand how problem framing facilitates unity of effort in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

This exposure would not have been possible without the efforts of Colonel H. Stacey Clardy, Commanding Officer RCT-2, Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Manning, Operations Officer, RCT-2, and Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Dill, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The aforementioned officers provided the mental framework and impetus for the establishment of Task Force 1/7's Campaign Plan. This document and the processes derived from its inception provided focus for our 7 months of combat operations. Additionally, the fine officers of the Operations Section, specifically Captain Tyler J. Moore and 1st Lieutenant Gregory D. Ostrin, developed the methodology that allowed us to learn about our environment and conduct meaningful operations that would have lasting effect on the population of Hit, Iraq. I am also indebted to the officers that answered my research questionnaire. Without them, I would have been unable to demonstrate that infantry battalions are utilizing Operational Design during combat operations to better understand the insurgency that they are required to counter.

Lastly, I am indebted to the staff of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College who helped make this work possible. Specific thanks go to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Paul K. Van Riper and my mentor Dr. Erin Simpson who introduced me to the theoretical background that has rounded out my basic understanding of Operational Design.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN: A key element in successful battalion level counterinsurgencies

> Design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated activities essential for solving complex problems. While planning activities receive constant emphasis in both doctrine and practice, discussion of design remains largely abstract and is rarely practiced. Presented a problem, staffs often rush directly into planning without clearly understanding the complex environment of the situation, purpose of military involvement, and approach required to address core issues. This situation is particularly problematic with insurgencies.[1]
>
> MCWP 3-33.5 (FM 3-24), Counterinsurgency

The aforementioned quotation provides an uncanny description of the problem faced by the staff of Task Force 1st Battalion, 7th Marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08.2. Shortly after arriving in country, Task Force 1/7 received the following mission: No later than 28 February 2008 transition your Battalion Area of Operation to Provincial Iraqi Control in order to facilitate the Government of Iraq's assumption of responsibility for the Al Anbar province from the Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Despite being well-versed in the Marine Corps Troop Leading Procedures (BAMCIS) and competent in the Marine Corps Planning Process, the staff of Task Force 1/7 was required to learn the complexities of Operational Design in order to solve this intricate problem while concurrently managing the daily, combat operations of a 1,300 man battalion task force. None of our training prepared the battalion staff to integrate with, plan for, and facilitate the enhanced operation of the local Iraqi City Councils, partnered Iraqi Army Battalions, and the local law enforcement establishment. Driven by the vision of a demanding Battalion Commander and aided by the examples of plans from higher and adjacent units, the staff of Task Force 1/7 developed our own extensive Battalion Level Campaign Plan after we arrived in Iraq. This document provided the conceptual framework that facilitated the rapid production of detailed plans (Operations Orders), aided the synchronization of efforts across multiple organizations (both military and non-military) helped establish a common level of

situational awareness throughout the Task Force, and greatly facilitated the accomplishment of our mission.

During this deployment, Task Force 1/7 was intimately involved in what David Galula describes as the Eighth Step of counter-insurgency operations: "Winning over or Suppressing the Last Guerillas."[2] While local insurgent groups were indeed on the verge of collapse, the battalion had the onerous challenge of simultaneously pursuing remaining insurgents via military means, attempting to cleanse the physical damages of four years of combat, enhancing the local economy, and preparing the local Army, Police, and City Council to fully assume the mantle of leadership for the District of Hit. It was within this context that the staff of Task Force 1/7 began to build a campaign plan that would guide the actions of the battalion and subordinate units towards the accomplishment of our clearly non-doctrinal, yet critically important mission. The issues described above are not unique to TF 1/7 and many military professionals have noted that the current doctrinal planning methodology must change in order to adequately address how infantry battalions should solve tactical level problems in a modern, inter-agency, counter-insurgency.

A CHANGE IS REQUIRED TO THE PLANNING METHODOLOGY STATUS QUO

The non-standard nature of the mission given to Task Force 1/7 can be only be fully understood by reviewing the 684 pages of the latest version of the Infantry Training and Readiness Manual which was published in 2005. This document does not even appear to mention counter-insurgency operations and definitely does not explain how an infantry battalion should plan to conduct them. Chapter 2 lists an example infantry battalion Mission Essential Task titled "Conduct Planning", but this task focuses primarily on conventional tasks related to a kinetic battle.[3]

Despite the need for knowledge pertaining to Operational Design, the United States Military has not yet changed its doctrine in this area. Multiple publications at the Service and Joint levels state that the Joint Force Commander normally conducts Operational Design at the Operational Level of War. The problem with this declarative doctrinal statement is that it prevents the formal exposure to and training of these concepts to the staff officers of the infantry battalion. Without training in Operational Design, these staff officers will possess only the Troop Leading Procedures and MCPP to guide their counterinsurgency planning efforts. The current doctrinal planning methodologies are indeed vital to the conduct of detailed planning. However, they exist to solve specific military problems, which present themselves in the form of a Higher Headquarters Operations Order. Conversely, Operational Design incorporated at the battalion level is important because design will provide battalion commanders with the ability to query "into the nature of a problem and conceive a framework for solving that problem."[4] Proper framing of the problem and understanding the context in which the problems exists facilitates the effective use of doctrinal planning methodologies.

In the current, complex, environment of today's counter-insurgencies infantry battalions must conduct elements of Operational Design to adequately determine *how* to solve these problems instead of merely deciding *what* to do in response to an assigned mission via the use of MCPP. Infantry battalions and regiments currently use Operational Design in Iraq in an attempt to better understand their complex operational environment. These same units are also using targeting and assessment methodologies to allocate and prioritize resources, synchronize operations conducted in coordination with a host of non-military agencies, and assess the effectiveness of their efforts. Unfortunately, the Pre-Deployment Training Program and current doctrine do not provide an adequate foundation in any of the above mentioned disciplines. A

lack of training results in confusion and frustration, because leaders and planners must learn how to navigate the complex environment of a counterinsurgency while concurrently conducting combat operations. Operational Design and an interactive, adaptive targeting process, which leads to learning and a constant re-design of the campaign plan, requires integration into infantry battalion training to ensure that battalion commanders and their staffs are properly prepared for real world contingencies.

The Way Ahead

Many veterans and observers of the current counter-insurgency in Iraq understand that tactical level units must operate in a non-standard, non-doctrinal, and decentralized fashion. However, much of the effort to ensure tactical level success focuses on *which TTPs* small unit, counter-insurgents should employ and how the military can better *man and equip* companies and squads to do these things. Unfortunately, few have discussed in earnest *how* tactical units should determine *what* to do in the conduct of small unit counter-insurgency. As the military shifts focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, determining how to conduct counter-insurgency operations at the battalion level will become even more important, because "inappropriate lessons from one insurgency are carried over and unconsciously laminated over an entirely different political conflict or socioeconomic context."[5] In order to successfully determine *how* to conduct counter-insurgency operations, infantry battalions, in conjunction with non-military and host nation actors, must conduct Operational Design prior to detailed planning by using doctrinal as well as non-doctrinal methods. These methods are necessary due to the complex nature of modern insurgencies, the interagency effort required to mount a successful counter-insurgency, and often vague information pertaining to the actual nature of the problems in an assigned Area of Operations.

This is not to say that DOD, the Army, or the United States Marine Corps should abandon doctrinal planning process like MCPP. Rather, this paper seeks to explain that counterinsurgencies are complex and require the use of Operational Design at the infantry battalion level to better frame the problem they face. The malleable format and the interactive, iterative nature of Operational Design allows for a myriad of actors to assist in problem framing. Proper framing of the problem situation and understanding the context in which the problem exists will facilitate the conduct of detailed planning. This monograph will proceed with a review of the historical and theoretical precedent for Operational Design at the tactical level (defined through the remainder of the text as a regiment or battalion), a discussion pertaining to the inadequacies of doctrinal planning methodologies when used to frame the problem, and the advantages that Operational Design provides when framing the problem. This monograph will also review case histories discussing how infantry battalions and regiments are using Operational Design to frame the tactical level problem and integrate their Operational Design with detailed planning via MCPP.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN DEFINED

In order to better understand the delineation between Operational Design and detailed planning it is important to first understand the purpose of each process. Operational Design "concentrates on *formulating* the problem to be solved rather than on developing potential solutions. This is not performing mission analysis as described in current planning procedures, but involves hypothesizing the causes and dynamics of the situation."[6] Simply put, design will allow the Infantry Battalion Commander and his staff to understand the "causes and dynamics" of the insurgency that they are required to counter. Proper understanding of the operational environment requires a collaborative process that integrates as many inter-agency actors as

possible and may even require staff officers to analyze non-doctrinal elements of the human terrain. This "inquiry into the nature, factors and dynamics of the problem situation ... should inform the initial establishment of aims, objectives and intentions and the development of broad concepts of actions."[7] These objectives and broad concepts of actions should act as the required inputs for detailed planning conducted via MCPP.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND MCPP IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

When it receives the appropriate inputs designed for conducting conventional military operations, the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) facilitates the conduct of detailed planning. Specifically, MCPP "uses Top-down planning and the single battle concept [to] ensure unity of effort, while the commander uses warfighting functions as the building blocks of integrated planning."[8] *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1* goes on to state that the "Marine Corps Planning Process establishes procedures for analyzing a mission ... and wargaming courses of action (COAs) against the threat."[9] As clearly stated above, MCPP requires well framed problems in the form of a mission statement from a unit's higher headquarters in order to begin detailed planning. Additionally, MCPP focuses heavily on the analysis of a mission as it relates to the enemy and provides limited room for the incorporation of inter-agency or host-nation partners. In contrast, Operational Design facilitates the follow on detailed planning required for successfully accomplishing those objectives by first formulating broad concepts and objectives designed to solve or influence the dynamics of a situation. As stated in *FM 3-24*, detailed planning "breaks the design into manageable pieces and assignable tasks."[10] In counterinsurgency, Operational Design allows the tactical commander to solve complex, primarily, non-military problems, by translating them into a series of understandable objectives.

PRECEDENT FOR OPERATIONAL DESIGN IN BATTALION LEVEL COUNTERINSURGENCIES

Counter-Insurgent theorists have long espoused the importance of inter-agency participation in a successful counter-insurgency. Unfortunately, the strict structure of MCPP is not suited for the integration of these key personnel or functional areas. See Appendix A for a graphic depiction of the steps within MCPP. Operational Design, however, can facilitate the inclusion of this vital information that will lead to the construction of broad concepts and objectives that will eventually feed into MCPP. As stated in *FM 3-24* "COIN is a struggle for the population's support."[11] Galula tells us that to win over the population and defeat an insurgency that the level of effort required is "20 percent military action and 80 percent political".[12] He describes this non-military effort as the political actions required to successfully garner the support of the population combined with the policing and judicial skills required to find and imprison the insurgents. While the inter-agency or the host-nation government may eventually assume control of or assist in the accomplishment of the non-military aspects of counterinsurgency, regrettably the "civil administration… is never up to the personnel requirements of a counterinsurgency".[13] For these reasons, Frank Kitson states that military officers must be "taught how to put a campaign together using a combination of civil and military measures to achieve a single government aim."[14] Despite the prescience of these authors who were writing almost 50 years ago and the obvious need for focused instruction on how to draft inter-agency campaign plans, doctrine is still not up to the task of clearly outlining how the military officer should "put the campaign together" at the battalion level.

Subject matter experts have also advocated for the conduct of Operational Design by tactical units in counter-insurgency. In David Kilcullen's treatise entitled "28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," he tells Company Commanders to

"Diagnose the problem," "Organize for inter-agency operations" and "Have a game plan."[15] Here, Dr. Kilcullen recommends that Company Commanders develop their plan via "'operational design.'"[16] While Company Commanders should adhere to Kilcullen's advice, they may have difficulty designing a campaign plan and concurrently performing their other duties because the company has a very small staff. The infantry battalion, however, actually possesses a staff that can do the things Kilcullen recommends, specifically plan for future operations while supporting the conduct of current operations.

The *USMC Small Wars Manual* also clearly describes the importance of a campaign plan in small wars and describes how the campaign plan relates to the accomplishment of the political objective. It goes on to state that the campaign plan forms the military objectives from the political objectives and provides an overall scheme for the conduct of the campaign.[17] Similarly to *FM 3-24*, the manual also states that the development of operations plans are required to accomplish the goals outlined in the campaign plan[18]. The *Small Wars Manual* also discusses the echelon of command that that might perform these functions in a small war: "It is possible to visualize an independent regiment in such a situation"[19]. For instance, smaller units can currently operate extreme distances away from their higher headquarters due to the advanced nature of command and control technology in the United States military. This technology allows infantry battalions to perform those duties in which the *Small Wars Manual* envisioned an independent regiment of accomplishing. In fact, Task Force 1/7 was purposefully partnered and shared similar Areas of Operation with the local District Mayor (similar to a county in the U.S. system) and District Police Chief to facilitate the accomplishment of Task Force 1/7's aforementioned mission. This level of partnership allowed the battalion to accomplish its assigned mission despite lacking specific guidance of how to accomplish this task.

DOCTRINAL PLANNING METHODS: INADEQUATE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY PROBLEM FRAMING

MCWP 3-33.5 (FM 3-24), Counterinsurgency

Despite the aforementioned rationale that clearly indicates that, Operational Design should occur in counterinsurgency at the battalion level, *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* states that, "campaign design is most often associated with a joint force command".[20] In fact, *FM 3-24* states, "design at the tactical level is a form of what Army doctrine calls commander's visualization".[21] According to *FM 3-24,* tactical level commanders conduct this "visualization" to form "the foundation for staff planning."[22] Additionally *FM 3-24* states, "Commanders begin developing their design upon receipt of a mission."[23] Unfortunately, this seminal publication on counterinsurgency seemingly indicates that a different type of planning is required for higher level units and infantry battalions need only to conduct a more robust detailed planning methodology akin to MCPP (Military Decision Making Process or MDMP for the Army). The incorporation of commander's visualization is supposed to help solve the complex problems infantry battalions face in a modern counterinsurgency.

FM 3-0, Operations

The new Army Doctrinal publication *FM 3-0*, published two years after *FM 3-24*, adds to and enhances the discussion about operational design. Unfortunately, *FM 3-0* also states, "Operational art is generally the purview of joint force commanders".[24] As discussed in the previous paragraph, it seems as though *FM 3-0* reserves the concept of Operational Design for joint force commanders and leaves tactical level units with only detailed planning processes. It is in this context that the reader learns about the Army's new concept of "Battle Command". Battle Command is described as "the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing,

directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander's will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy."[25] See Appendix B for a graphic depiction of the Battle Command process.

It appears as though *FM 3-0* is attempting to use the concept of Battle Command to kludge certain aspects of Operational Design into MDMP in order to make it both an intuitive and an analytical process. In other words, *FM 3-0* seemingly attempts to use the same process to frame a complex problem and conduct detailed planning. As previously discussed, design must preclude detailed planning in order to allow the Infantry Battalion Commander and his staff to understand the "causes and dynamics" of the insurgency before attempting to counter that insurgency. The objectives and broad concepts of actions developed through the design process should act as the required inputs for detailed planning conducted via MCPP or MDMP.

Clearly, *FM 3-0's* description of the inter-relationship between design and planning is not sufficient for counterinsurgency operations. Expounding upon the Battle Command process *FM 3-0* states that, "Analysis of the enemy and the operational variables provides the information senior commanders use to develop understanding."[26] However, knowledge of the enemy and operational variables may be difficult to obtain in a complex counterinsurgency. Additionally, the "Battle Command" concept states that, "Assignment of a mission provides the focus for developing the commander's visualization."[27] The mission given to Task Force 1/7, discussed in the opening paragraph of this paper, clearly disproves this point. Specifically, the *Small Wars Manual* describes the receipt of a mission statement as a confusing situation that requires effort to clarify the mission. "Frequently the commander of a force operating in a small wars theater of operations is not given a specific mission as such in his written orders or directive, and it then becomes necessary for him to deduce his mission from the general intent of the higher authority, or even from the foreign policy of the United States."[28] Operational Design will provide infantry

battalions with the capability to adequately "deduce" their mission as it relates to their complex environment.

MCWP 5-1, The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process seems to suffer from similar ailments as the Battle Command Concept. The Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE) along with the Commander's Initial Guidance, merely inputs into the more detailed Mission Analysis step of MCPP, comprise the process for visualizing or framing the problem in MCPP. *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1* states that CBAE "is the commander's personal vision based on his understanding of the mission, the battlespace, and the enemy."[29] As discussed above, knowledge pertaining to the enemy and even the mission can be elusive or confusing in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, the details required to adequately understand an irregular enemy cannot be accomplished by one person. Additionally, this responsibility would become more difficult at higher echelons of command.[30]

An article written by the staff of the MAGTF Staff Training Program after the release of the most recent version of *MCWP 5-1* further illustrates the points described above. This article describes Operational Design in a similar fashion to the Army's Concept of Battle Command.[31] Appendix C provides a graphic depiction of this concept. Specifically, the MSTP Staff attempts to explain that MCPP already incorporates design through the use of CBAE and Commander's Guidance. Unfortunately, a detailed planning process constructed to support the conduct of conventional operations does not facilitate an infantry battalion's understanding of the nature of modern insurgencies. Therefore, battalions must conduct Operational Design to properly frame the problem and develop a series of understandable objectives. These objectives can then feed MCCP to facilitate detailed planning.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF A COUNTERINSURGENCY NECESSITATES THE USE OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AT THE BATTALION LEVEL

The following discussion will highlight why an understanding of "the enemy and … operational variables" are difficult to obtain in modern counterinsurgencies. In his 2006 article, "Counter-insurgency *Redux,*" David Kilcullen outlines the complexities of modern insurgencies and provides some guidance for the counter-insurgent. He states that a modern counterinsurgency occurs in a "'conflict ecosystem'" with multiple competing entities seeking to maximize their survivability and influence."[32] In this "conflict ecosystem", Kilcullen states that these "competing entities" include various different insurgent groups, as well as the host nation government and its allies. The "conflict ecosystem" is more challenging than a normal conventional military problem because these entities often have competing goals. Additionally, the "counter-insurgent's task may no longer be to defeat the insurgent, but rather to impose order … on an unstable and chaotic environment."[33] Adding to this complexity, Kilcullen states that many modern insurgencies lack a specific agenda and merely exist to resist the counter-insurgent instead of seeking to establish an insurgent led, parallel government designed to compete with the current host nation government. Adding still to this complexity is the pervasiveness of modern communications technology, which he states compresses the levels of war in such a fashion that the tactical actions in strictly combat operations may have strategic impact. This complexity requires "Commander's even at the lowest tactical level … to conceive of their task as a form of 'political warfare.'"[34]

Without specifically mentioning Operational Design, Kilcullen alludes to similar methods that allow a disparate counterinsurgent force to better frame the problem. In order to succeed in this "conflict environment" he states that the counter-insurgent must achieve unity of effort amongst numerous actors, such as the inter-agency, international media, and various Non-

Governmental Organizations, who are not subordinate to military command. A "common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for collaboration" establish unity of effort.[35] While Kilcullen does not mention at which level of war this "collaborative process" should take place, it is important to note that Task Force 1/7 had almost daily interaction with many of the disparate actors mentioned by him. Very few of these disparate actors were directly under the command of the Battalion Commander and our campaign plan did allow us to better integrate them into our daily operations.

Operational Design facilitates the understanding of "Wicked Problems"

In a 2006 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab concept paper titled "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," John Schmitt describes the problems faced by modern military commanders in a manner that is strikingly similar to Dr. Kilcullen's description of the "conflict ecosystem". Schmitt hypothesizes that, in the future, modern military commanders at all levels will face "wicked problems."[36] These "wicked problems" also described as "complex operational situations," pertain to "primarily social problems that are particularly difficult and confusing, though not necessarily irresolvable."[37] Schmitt goes on to describe these "wicked problems" as situations that are "essentially unknowable"[38] and states that leaders can develop a systematic understanding of these problems to cope "with pervasive uncertainty rather than trying to eliminate it."[39] Schmitt also states that "solutions to wicked problems … must be *created* rather than chosen" and that "Each wicked problem is a one-of-a-kind situation requiring a custom solution rather than a standard solution modified to fit circumstances."[40]

While the astute observer may believe that Schmitt is describing Course of Action Development as the vehicle to solve these "wicked problems," he believes that detailed planning follows operational design. Schmitt states that design must occur prior to detailed planning

because Operational Design first formulates or hypothesizes the problem. Then detailed planning can solve the problem once identified. Schmitt is quick to point out that formulating the problem is not mission analysis and that detailed planning functions within the "conceptual framework" outlined by operational design.

Schmitt clearly differs from doctrine by alluding to the fact that commanders at all levels should apply the concepts of operational design when faced with "wicked problems". Schmitt also breaks from doctrine by stating, "Commanders cannot apply the time-tested methods learned from experience" and that "commanders must first be able to form an understanding of a situation on its own terms"[41]. These ideas clearly break from the Battle Command and CBAE concepts that attempt to frame the problem using the same old or even slightly enhanced detailed planning processes. Schmitt states that when facing "wicked problems" that the "commander should precede current planning procedures with an iterative, conversational design process."[42] This process allows for the commander and his staff to call on the knowledge of a myriad group of military and non-military members whose ideas and information will establish a broad understanding of the problem situation. Once the problem is adequately framed, the commander and his staff can outline the broad objectives and concepts of action that can feed the detailed planning. A robust targeting effort geared to influence or affect the objectives of the original design facilitates the iterative nature of the process. Once those actions have taken place, assessment occurs to discern the impacts of those actions. This enhanced learning about the problem situation should allow the commander to re-design the conceptual framework of his original design and facilitate continued improvement of the problem situation.

John Schmitt's concept of operational design is also beneficial because he does not attempt to frame the problem in terms of friendly or enemy forces. Unlike MCPP and MDMP,

Schmitt seeks to create an operational design process based on systems thinking that garners the causes of the problem situation instead of relating the solution of the problem to the defeat of an enemy force. Following this line of thinking it is reasonable to conceive that insurgent groups could actually be symptoms of the problem situation and not the primary cause of the problem. The insurgent may have taken up arms in order to forcefully obtain societal changes that non-violent action did not previously address. Solving those original societal changes and not fighting the insurgent may be the best way to influence the problem situation.

While the tactical level commander must defend himself from kinetic attacks and provide for the security of the populace, he must understand that these military actions may only disrupt the attacks and not prevent them. The tactical level commander must analyze and doggedly pursue the enemy in front of him, but that should not come at the sacrifice of understanding the source of the insurgency and combating the issues that caused the insurgency. There is more to be accomplished at the tactical level than fighting insurgents, hence the need for Operational Design which will facilitate a thorough understanding of the problem and focus efforts at the tactical level.

TARGETING AND ASSESSMENT: INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE DESIGN PROCESS

Targeting and assessment are other key components to the design process. The Campaign Plan generated by the initial operational design may exist in a fashion that provides only broad guidance for a long duration of time. In order to facilitate the execution of actions required to achieve the endstate of the campaign these broad concepts must undergo significant refinement. Using the original framework for the operational design, a targeting process can be developed that will provide the granularity required to support detailed planning and eventually execution.

For example, many commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations choose to use Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs: Governance, Economics, Transition, Rule of Law, and Security for example) as the primary element of their operational design. The LLOs are utilized to further define how the commander would like to frame the problem. The LLOs may help address social, political, or legal concerns that the problem framing process deemed as the initial causes of the insurgency. The commander may articulate a broad endstate or objective for each LLO that will allow his staff to conduct further analysis and determine how to accomplish the endstate for the various LLOs. Finally, detailed analysis of the endstate or objective for each LLO results in the development of a series of goals or sub-objectives that facilitate the accomplishment of the overall endstate for each specific LLO. These LLO sub-objectives represent tangible requirements needed to accomplish the endstate for each LLO. Meeting the endstate for LLOs should eventually result in achieving the endstate for the campaign. Appendix D provides a graphic depiction pertaining to the interrelation between campaign endstate, LLO endstate, and LLO sub-objectives.

Targeting: A Bridge Connecting Design and Detailed Planning

Once sufficient granularity is available to facilitate detailed planning, the targeting process can provide the mechanism to determine when and how action will be taken to influence LLO sub-objectives. The targeting process should help the unit leadership prioritize the resources required to influence LLO sub-objectives that are critical for the success of a specific portion of the campaign. The targeting process can also act to synchronize targeted action within one or more LLOs, which will ensure unity of effort. Assessment of the actions taken to influence LLO sub-objectives will also occur during the targeting process. The assessment of

actions taken to influence a LLO sub-objective should inform the commander about the impact the action had on the overall problem situation.

When the commander has decided upon the actions required to influence LLO sub-objectives the staff can then begin detailed planning. Detailed planning via the use of MCPP develops the courses of action required to influence the LLO sub-objectives as directed via the targeting process. In fact, *FM 3-24* states: "Executing targeting decisions may require the operations section to issue fragmentary orders."[43]

As described above, the targeting process began with the LLO sub-objectives and used this design framework to distill the problem into manageable pieces and perhaps even MOEs/MOPs (see Appendix D). Then the commander, with the assistance of the staff who was organized to facilitate targeting, chose actions he believed were require to influence the LLOs through their sub-objectives, and hence the overall campaign. Finally, the staff took the aforementioned specific initiatives decided upon by the commander and developed detailed plans or operations orders via the use of MCPP. In essence, the targeting process takes the initial operational design and boils the problem of the "insurgency" down to a specific mission in which MCPP is designed to accommodate.

Assessment: Allows for learning which facilitates Re-Design

Assessment is more than just a sub-component of the targeting process. Assessment facilitates operational design by developing a more in depth understanding of the problem situation. This knowledge may lead to a re-framing of the problem. The re-design of the campaign plan is critical when facing "wicked problems" that occur in a "conflict ecosystem." Even through the most thorough of design processes with the most experienced staff and commander, there is simply too much information to adequately integrate into the design

process. Assessment allows "the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation."[44] Monitoring the progress of operations via measures of effectiveness that "align with the design and reflect the emphasis on and interrelationship among the LLOs"[45] or other design elements will allow for learning about the operational environment. This enhanced knowledge of the "wicked problem" or "conflict ecosystem", which is gained through the targeting process, will allow the staff to adjust the design as directed by the commander. Appendix E provides a graphic depiction of the design process and it's relation to the targeting process.

Unfortunately, *MCWP 3-16, Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*, states that the Division is the only element within the GCE that possesses the manpower to perform targeting, and there is no mention of how to conduct targeting or assessment within a COIN environment.[46] These processes require teaching at the tactical level to enhance COIN operations and allow for the re-design of tactical level campaign plans that will facilitate efficient infantry battalion level COIN operations. Without instruction pertaining to targeting and assessment methodology, then Operational Design might end where it began: the new fad in counterinsurgency planning. While the problem framing methodology is one key aspect that makes Operational Design beneficial in solving complex problems, the assessment of actions taken which leads to thoughtful re-framing of the problem is another critical aspect of design. Targeting and assessment prevents design from becoming a linear planning methodology and allows the counterinsurgent to adapt alongside the evolving problem situation.

CASE STUDIES (Evidence from the Field)

The following sections will utilize information gleaned from Regimental Combat Team 2 and many of its subordinate battalions during "The Surge" of 2007-2008. The purpose of these

case studies is to demonstrate that tactical level units are using operational design, targeting, and assessment to successfully understand "wicked problems" and navigate through the "conflict ecosystems" they face. Despite the fact that RCT-2 published a Campaign Plan and supporting Operational Plans, a majority of the subordinate battalions found it necessary and indeed beneficial to generate their own Campaign Plans. While RCT-2's Campaign Plan assisted in framing the situation for subordinate units, additional refinement was required to support detailed planning.

Regimental Combat Team 2

Upon returning from deployment in early 2008, RCT-2 developed an unclassified, 35 page document which was designed to "explore the operational level of counterinsurgency warfare to identify toolsets available to commanders to provide the critical linkages between strategic goals and tactical execution."[47] The Commanding Officer of RCT-2 believed the planning and direction conducted by he and his staff were akin to that which is normally conducted at the operational level of war (i.e. - tying strategic ends into tactical action) due to the complexity required to accomplish the RCT's mission.[48] This is not to say that the RCT Commander is operating at the operational level of war (the level of the Joint Force Commander) during combat operations in support of OIF. However, numerous intricacies surround the solving of "wicked problems" in counterinsurgency at the RCT level. Inter-agency problem framing techniques, typically utilized at the operational level of war, are required to solve these problems. The RCT is clearly a tactical level unit, but was required to think and plan like an operational level staff due to the numerous inter-agency and host nation governmental entities that the RCT dealt with on a daily basis. It was in this complex environment[49] that RCT-2 developed a method for problem framing via Operational Design, detailed planning via the

MCPP, and assessment via a robust targeting process that facilitated a unity of effort across the myriad of actors that abound in a modern counterinsurgency.

Prior to explaining RCT-2's concept for operational design, they first clarify the relationship between design and planning as depicted in Appendix F. With the relationship between design and planning defined, the RCT-2 publication discusses the structure for the Operational Design process and emphasizes that "[regimental] commanders should use the structure they believe fits their specific situations best."[50] Appendix G depicts an example structure for Operational Design in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Clearly, a departure from MCPP, the selection of a structure for the Operational Design allows the commander and staff to tailor the problem framing architecture to the actual problem situation instead of relying on a "one size fits all" structure.

Appendix H depicts the design process utilized by RCT-2 in support of counterinsurgency operations during OIF 06-08. Critical to this process is the identification of endstate objectives. The mission and intent of the RCT commander, the mission and intent of the RCT's higher headquarters, and the appropriate tenets from counterinsurgency doctrine and theory formed the basis of these endstate objectives. The RCT-2 publication states that in "counterinsurgency operations, the endstate may be better expressed in relation to the population, the government, indigenous security forces and others."[51] Once endstate objectives are indentified, then the LLOs or LOO (Line of Operation) are selected that will best facilitate accomplishment of endstate objectives. The next critical step outlined by RCT-2 is the backward planning required to establish intermediate objectives that will facilitate the achievement of the endstate objectives. Next, intermediate objectives by LOO are developed. The final step is to develop a concept for execution that will entail how detailed planning conducted via targeting,

assessment, and the orders process will support the accomplishment of intermediate objectives and eventually endstate objectives. Appendix I provides a graphic depiction of how this process works.

Battalions subordinate to RCT-2

A critical aspect of the RCT-2 campaign plan was to provide subordinate battalions with an echelon or level at which to focus on problem framing via operational design. This was as important as establishing geographic boundaries detailing the subordinate battalions' Areas of Operation. IN effect, RCT-2 gave the battalions a "box" in which they needed to focus with respect to problem framing along LLOs. Another critical aspect of the RCT-2 campaign plan was the campaign plan structure. Battalions did not need to determine the structure required for the conduct of design at their levels. Subordinate battalions generally utilized the structure provided by the RCT and deviated and refined as necessary. This was important because "each [Battalion] AO had different insurgent groups with differing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), it was often necessary to treat each AO separately"[52]. The result was that the RCT-2 campaign plan provided subordinate units with a lexicon that was consistent across the regiment, but flexible enough to facilitate more detailed problem framing and detailed planning at the infantry battalion level.

The Battalion Commanders and Operations Officers that were subordinate to RCT-2 during "the Surge" of 2007-2008 received questionnaires via email. The following text will discuss the data compiled from the questionnaires. At least one respondent from nine battalions replied out of 14 battalions surveyed[53]. Appendix J displays the questionnaire. Appendix K depicts raw data and analysis from responses to selected questions from the questionnaire.

While the RCT-2 Campaign Plan clearly focused the efforts of subordinate battalions, six of the nine battalions specifically state that they used "Operational Design" or developed a "Campaign Plan" to facilitate detailed planning. However, all six battalions conducted this process in a myriad of different ways and used different terminology to describe the process they utilized. One respondent was honest enough to admit that he was not familiar with the terms "Operations Design" or "Campaign Planning". Obviously, it does not appear that his battalion utilized operational design as a pre-cursor to detailed planning. Most respondents that used Operational Design said it was beneficial because design allowed them to integrate instruments of National Power, focus on non-kinetic operations or operations to support the LLOs, and provided a long term view for their deployment. Many respondents also stated that Operational Design was important because it provided a template for their operations, helped develop general principles that guided all members within the unit, and helped focus the staff and many disparate supporting organizations. One of the most common benefits described by those using Operational Design was that the Campaign Plan, developed through the design process, provided continuity from one battalion to the next. This continuity is important in an environment where constant unit turn over occurs in the short term, yet the problems remain for the long term.

Col James Parrington, the Commanding Officer of 3rd Light Armor Reconnaissance Battalion, clearly articulated the importance of Operational Design at the battalion level in the following response from his questionnaire:

> we needed a[n] operational design that would carry us through 7 months of operations. … Once this was complete (or good enough) we were able to focus the staff on developing plans to support my operational design. … getting the operational design right was instrumental in developing a campaign plan. … I am convinced that if not done [the operational design] the subsequent planning and execution would have been simply a series of orders/FRAGOs that were not connected to anything.[54]

LtCol James Donnellan, Commanding Officer of Second Battalion, 3rd Marines states that he utilized a modified version of Systemic Operational Design to gain a true understanding of the nature of the problem that he faced in his area of operations. His comments also illustrate the importance of Operational Design at the level of the infantry battalion:

> While our campaign plan may not have been a multi-year plan, or include a method of assessment, it was intended to carry on from unit to unit and be the basis on which to develop tactical plans. … In both Afghanistan and Iraq, having a Campaign Plan was critical in pulling our focus away from the kinetic fight and applying both intellectual energy and resources across all Lines of Operation.[55]

At least five out of the nine battalions demonstrated a basic understanding that Operational Design occurs as a precursor to focus the detailed planning. The two Battalion Commanders quoted above clearly understood this relationship prior to their deployment, however many of the other respondents seem to indicate an incomplete understanding of the relationship between design and planning. This is especially interesting because eight out of the nine battalions utilized the LLOs (an element of RCT-2's Operational Design) to augment detailed planning in conjunction with MCPP. Additionally, eight out of the nine battalions established endstates for each LLO to guide the operations of their unit. It is important to note that these endstates by LLO were specific for each battalion, even for those that state they did not utilize Operational Design. The use of an element of Operational Design, in this case the LLOs, without a complete use of Operational Design clearly show that detailed planning via MCPP is not sufficient by itself. While some of the battalions questioned may have only used the LLOs in an attempt to stay in step with RCT-2, it is evident that most respondents were looking for a method of planning that would facilitate counterinsurgency operations. It is clear that enhanced training is required to ensure leaders at the battalion level understand the relationship between

design and planning and to provide them with the tools they need to adequately frame the problem and feed their detailed planning.

All nine battalions utilized some form of targeting. Eight out of nine battalions that responded stated that they conducted "non-kinetic" targeting as well as "kinetic targeting".[56] Again, the processes utilized by the battalions were numerous. One respondent defined their process as "very informal". However, many other battalions had a robust series of targeting meetings that utilized the entire staff as well as Company Level Intelligence Cells to formulate a better understanding of the AO. Multiple battalions morphed their staff to conduct targeting. This was done through the development of an Effects Cell in one case while other battalions re-organized their staff to plan and target along the LLOs. This dual staff structure allowed for a more detailed review of all aspects of the LLOs, generating a better understanding of the AO and ensured a focused approach in allocating resources.

Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not specifically address how units assessed their operations. However, the questionnaires did show that at least two battalions developed in depth methods to conduct assessment that incorporated Measures of Effectiveness for each LLO. Additionally, the use of LLOs by a majority may have provided a basic method for assessment for the other battalions subordinate to RCT-2. The RCT assessed the condition of subordinate battalion Areas of Operation as well as its own Area of Operation based on a subjective judgment pertaining to the status of each LLO. Similarly to Operational Design, infantry battalions do not receive training in targeting or assessment. One battalion commander described his experience with "non-kinetic" targeting as follows: "I was never wholly comfortable with this – certainly something we could have used additional training on."[57] As a Battalion Operations Officer at the time, I can commiserate with the above statement. Infantry Battalions

need a method for allocating numerous resources, synchronizing the efforts of multiple assets, and conducting assessment that allows the counterinsurgent to adapt alongside the evolving problem situation.

CONCLUSION

Infantry battalions and regiments in Iraq are currently using Operational Design in an attempt to better understand their complex environment. These same units are also using targeting and assessment methodologies to allocate and prioritize resources, synchronize operations conducted in coordination with a host of non-military agencies, and assess the effectiveness of their efforts. Unfortunately, the Pre-Deployment Training Program and current doctrine do not provide an adequate foundation in any of the above mentioned disciplines. A lack of training results in confusion and frustration, because leaders and planners must learn how to navigate the complex environment of a counterinsurgency while concurrently conducting combat operations. Infantry battalion training must integrate Operational Design and an interactive, adaptive targeting process that leads to learning and a constant re-design of the campaign plan. Knowledge of design will ensure that battalion commanders and their staffs are properly prepared for real world contingencies.

As Colonel Parrington stated in his questionnaire, "Our operational design led to a plan that was somewhere between campaign planning and an operations order. You won't find that in doctrine anywhere."[58] Colonel Parrington's response describes in essence what Task Force 1/7 and many others battalions have developed to better adjudicate their "wicked problems". The ability to generate these non-doctrinal solutions will become ever more important as we ask our military leaders to conduct the non-military functions that are necessary to succeed in a counterinsurgency conducted at the tactical level.

The United States Marine Corps does not need to throw out the Marine Corps Planning Process. It is a time tested detailed planning tool. Linear planning process, such as MCPP and BAMICS, are applicable for linear problems like developing a schedule of fires, amphibious offloads, conducting logistics planning, and executing time sensitive mission. However, as Marines need to be equipped to understand the complex challenges on the modern battlefield. Formal training in the field of Operational Design will facilitate the understanding of these complex challenges.

Appendix A



Figure 1-1. Steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process.

Author's Note: The process is conducted in a linear, step by step process where the outputs from one step act as the input from another step. Staff members provide advice and input based on their Military Occupational Specialty or Warfighting Function. There are no formal points for input by the inter-agency. Additionally, the first input is a mission statement from the unit's higher headquarters. Properly written mission statements (including the elements of who, what, where, when, and why) allow this process to continue with ease. When the problem situation is too complicated to be formulated into a precise mission statement, then difficulties occur when using MCPP.

Source: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-1, with Change* 1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 24 September 2001), Figure 1-1 from page 1-3. Notes on top of diagram added by author.

Appendix B



Source: Headquarters Department of the Army, *Operations, FM 3-0*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), Figure 5-1 from page 5-3. Notes on top of diagram added by author.

Appendix C



Figure 1. Operational design.

Source: MSTP Staff, "Operational Design," *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 2001): Figure 1 from page 36. http://www.proquest.com/.

Appendix D



Source: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 15 December 2006), Figure 5-2 page 5-5. Author's additions at bottom of chart.

Appendix D

Communication LLO

MOP for each LLO sub-objective			Endstate for LLO objective with MOP defining success	Sub-objective of LLO which relate to success in each LLO
<10% of population has land line in their home	<25% of population has land line in their home	<50% of population has land line in their home	75% + have land line in their home	**Land Lines**
<10% of population has access to cell phones	<25% of population has access to cell phones	<50% of population has access to cell phones	75% + have access to cell phones	**Cell Phone**
Cell phone towers support <10% of population demand	Cell phone towers support <25% of population demand	Cell phone towers support <50% of population demand	Cell phone towers capable of supporting 75%+ of population demands	**Cell Phone Towers**
Officials do not communicate well. No or little progress made in meetings.	Officials communication fair. Some progress made in meetings.	Officials communication good. Meetings have agenda.	Officials communication excellent. Meetings have agenda and it is met.	**Govt Officials Communications**
Govt Officials have no means of physical communication	Govt Officials only communicate in person.	Govt Officials communication limited but occurs.	Govt Officials have full communications in all directions via land and cell phone.	**Intra Govt Comm (I.E. land line/ cell phone etc)**
<10% of population has access to internet	<25% of population has access to internet	<50% of population has access to internet	75% + of population has access to internet	**Internet**
No paper or magazine distribution in AO	Monthly paper of magazine distribution in AO	Weekly paper of magazine distribution in AO	Daily paper or magazine distribution in AO	**Newspaper/ Magazine**
No radio stations in AO.	Radio stations received in AO but only coalition supported	Radio stations received in AO that are non-coalition supported. None local.	Radio stations transmitted from and received in AO	**Radio**

Designed by: Capt Gregory Ostrin, and Maj Gregory Jones

Appendix E



Source: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 15 December 2006), Figure 4-2 page 4-5. Author's additions at bottom of chart

Figure 4-2. Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design

Appendix F



Author's note: The RCT first drafted a Base Operations Order which was designed to establish the initial Commander's Intent, standard operating procedure within the RCT, and the reporting requirements necessary to conduct daily combat operations. Then, 2-3 months after arriving in Iraq they developed a campaign plan designed to "frame the course of regimental and battalion operations" (Chapter 3, Page 2 of RCT-2 Counterinsurgency Operations publication). Additionally, the campaign plan allowed the commander and staff to "develop a detailed, first hand, understanding of the current situation and environment" (Chapter 3, Page 2 of RCT-2 Counterinsurgency Operations publication). "As the last link in the chain in the orders construct, FRAGOs directing operations translate the campaign plan into tactical action." (Chapter 3, Page 3 of RCT-2 Counterinsurgency Operations publication).

Source: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Figure 1, Chapter 3, page 2, with note from author.

Appendix G

Example Campaign Plan Structure

- Enemy assessment
- Friendly assessment
- Lines of operation (LOO) identification and definitions
- LOO assessments
- Campaign plan endstate objectives
- Campaign plan phasing
- Campaign plan intermediate objectives by phase
- Targeting methodology

Source: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Figure 2, Chapter 3, page 3.

Appendix H

Campaign plan development



Source: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Figure 3, Chapter 3, page 5.

Appendix I



Source: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication* , Figure 4, Chapter 4, page 2. Author's note added at bottom of graphic.

Appendix J

Questionnaire

1. Did your Higher Headquarters provide sufficient METT-TC and Higher HQ intent for your Area of Operations to plan and conduct operations for the entirety of your deployment?

1a. If yes to Question 1, was the information provided via a Higher Headquarters' Campaign Plan with follow-on supporting Operations Orders or FRAGOs?

1b. If no to Question 1, how was direction passed from your Higher Headquarters?

1c. Regardless to answers in Questions 1a and b, how did you conduct mission analysis for your operations?

2. When planning for operations, did you conduct "Operational Design" or "Campaign Planning" prior to developing Operation Orders (i.e., did you have a Campaign Plan that focused planning for the duration of your deployment or for subsequent operations after the Relief in Place)?

2a. If yes to Question 2, did "Operational Design" or "Campaign Planning" help you define the tactical problem through "visualizing" and "describing" the problem? In what way did it help you?

2b. If no to Question 2, how did you define the tactical problem faced by your unit and plan to solve this problem? (i.e. - did you have an Operational Order or similar document that facilitated the generation of follow-on orders/plans)?

3. What method of planning (i.e.-MCPP/MDMP or Logical Lines of Operation) did your unit utilize to plan and conduct operations within your Area of Operations?

3a. If only one planning method was utilized, was it effective or not? Explain how or how not?

3b. If no singular method of planning was used, did you use a combination of planning methods? How did they relate to one another?

4. Regardless of the planning method used, did you find the service or Joint Planning Doctrine used sufficient to guide your planning efforts?

4a. Were other resources used to assist in your planning for counter-insurgency operations? (Please discuss alternate planning theories, doctrinal publications, and authors/books referenced to formulate your planning methodology).

5. Did your unit determine an endstate for your Area of Operations within the timeframe of your deployment?

5a. What was the endstate? How was the endstate articulated?

Designed by: Major Gregory Jones

Appendix J

5b. If yes to question 5, was the endstate determined for the entire AO, by phase of your deployment, by Line of Operation, or a combination of methods?

5c. If no to Question 5, how did you synchronize operations toward the endstate within your AO?

5d. Regardless of answers in Questions 5a or 5b, what specific planning methods did you utilize to guide subordinate unit operations toward the endstate during your deployment?

6. Did you plan for operations in a sequential or parallel fashion? Why or why not?

7. Did you conduct "targeting" to facilitate the Commander's direction of assets in support of kinetic or non-kinetic operations? (For the purpose of this question, kinetic operations includes conventional and security operations and non-kinetic operations includes Civil Affairs, Support Operations, and operations in support of planning along Lines of Operation.)

7a. If yes to Question 7, did you divide the targeting process between kinetic and non-kinetic operations? Was dividing the process beneficial or not?

7a1. Describe your targeting process.

7b. If no to Question 10, how did your unit allocate assets to accomplish assigned tasks/priorities (either assigned internally or by Higher Headquarters)?

7b1. Describe this process.

8. Based on your answers to questions 5-10, was your unit Task Organized sufficiently to plan and conduct counter-insurgency operations?

8a. If yes to question 8, what additional assets/personnel did you require, specifically in the area of planning for and supervising operations, to successfully accomplish your mission?

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Appendix K

Question #	Yes	No	Other	The so what
1	5	4		
BN's Yes	BN's No			
[redacted]			2 of no's spent much time under RCT 7	Yeses refined however, as time went on
2	6	3		1 respondent did not know of Op design at the time. All others used LOOs for planning or at least tracking and presumably got them from HHQ or refined them. 1 unit did not receive a campaign plan until they were about to leave. Some seem to think that a Campaign plan refers to design, but is an output of design which they state was done via MCPP Shows they were attempting to frame problem, but we don't all have same lexicon.
BN's Yes	BN's No			
[redacted]			66.67 % of respondents used Design. 1 unit used general principles from a Campaign Plan, 1 unit planned along LOOs, 1 unit used LOOs for tracking	
3	MCPP	LOO		
BN's Yes	BN's Yes	BN's Yes		
	9	9	88.89% used LOOs to focus planning. 8 R2P2, Op Rod	8 BN's used LOOs of some type IOT focus planning. 1 unit used it to track progress All discussed using MCPP or a modified version. LOO did not supplant, but rather augment MCPP. LOO obviously an output of RCT 2 Campaign Plan.
5	9	0		
BN's Yes	BN's No		100% defined an endstate of some kind.	Framing Problem and determining goals and objectives (check Schmitt's verbiage) are important to all.
5a	Endstate LOO	Endstate other		
	8	1	88.89% used endstate by LOO. Defined by enemy, Friendly, HN security forces, local government, for AO in entirety	1 unit did not actually state they developed endstate by LOO, but their categories for developing endstates were consistent with RCT LOO categories.
7	9	0		
BN's Yes	BN's No			1 BN CO admitted to wanting more training on this topic. 1 unit mentioned their process was very informal. Some BN's had very robust targeting processes with S-3 and S-2 focused on kinetic and BN CO, CAG, and or XO focusing on non-kinetic. Those who split process ensured some type of synchronization because efforts in one area influenced another.
			All Bn's used some type of targeting. Only 1 BN did not mention non-kinetic targeting. 2 BNs seemingly had a less formal processes.	
7a	Kinetic yes	non-kinetic yes		Only 1 unit made no mention of non-kinetic. They most likely conducted this (as the questionnaire defined it as integrating CA and the unit had a CA det), but respondent may not have been aware.
8		1	Not everyone had the same process, but all did it in some form or another.	

Designed by: Major Gregory Jones

Notes

[1] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 15 December 2006), 4-2.
[2]David Galula, Counterinsurgency *Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006) 93.
[3] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Infantry Training and Readiness Manual, (*Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1 September 2005), 2-1.

MET 2 – CONDUCT PLANNING
INF-OFF-6101 Process known or suspected enemy personnel
INF-COMM-6201 Operate without radio communications
INF-FSPT-6301 Conduct fire support planning
INF-FSTP-6302 Conduct Fire Support Team operations
INF-OPS-6401 Prepare for combat operations
INF-OPS-6402 Operate a command post
INF-LOG-6410 Conduct tactical logistics
INF-MED-6430 Process casualties
INF-INT-6440 Plan intelligence collection
INF-INT-6441 Direct the intelligence effort
INF-OPS-6610 Employ mortars
INF-AMPH-6901 Prepare for amphibious operations
INF-INT–7401 Direct the intelligence effort
INF-AMPH-7901 Conduct amphibious staff planning
INF-AMPH-7902 Develop the landing plan

[4] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* 4-2.
[5] LtCol F.G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret), "Best Practices in Countering Insurgencies: Compressing the learning curve," *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 2007): 47, http://www.proquest.com/.
[6] John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design" (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Concepts and Plans Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab concept paper, August 2006), 4, http://www.scribd.com/doc/1485171/US-Air-Force-mcwl-schmitt-op-design?page=55.
[7] Schmitt, 6.
[8] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-1, with Change 1* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 24 September 2001) 1-2.
[9] *Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-1, with Change 1.* 1-3.
[10] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* 4-3.
[11] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5.* 1-28.
[12] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 63.*
[13] Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 62.*
[14] Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 1992), 166.
[15] David Kilcullen. "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May-June 2006): 2-4, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun06/webpdf/BoB_Insights_Reviews_Letters_MJ06.pdf .
[16] IBID
[17] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 22 December 1990), 2-9. "The political objective indicates the general character of the campaign which the military leader will undertake. The campaign plan indicates the military objective and, in general terms, the nature and method of conducting the campaign.
[18] *Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15*, 2-9, "If the campaign plan calls for the organization of a native constabulary, detailed plans must be made for its early organization and training. If the campaign plan calls for the employment of local armed civilians or guards, or if such action is considered necessary or advisable, plans must be made for the organization, training, equipment, supply, clothing, subsistence, pay, shelter, and employment of such troops."
[19] *Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15*, 2-11.

[20] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5*. 4-1.
[21] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5*. 4-2.
[22] IBID
[23] IBID
[24] Headquarters Department of the Army, *Operations, FM 3-0*. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), 6-5. The discussion on the same page goes on to state that "Land component commanders are not directly responsible for defining the military endstate. Nonetheless, their participation in the initial stages of campaign design is vital."
[25] *Operations, FM 3-0*. 5-2.
[26] *Operations, FM 3-0*. 5-4.
[27] *IBID*.
[28] *Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15*, 2-2.
[29] *Marine Corps Planning Process, MCWP 5-1, with Change 1* 2-2.
[30] However, the commander's personal interaction with key leaders within the populace and his general estimate of the situation are key components to the collective understanding of the unit's battlespace.
[31] MSTP Staff, "Operational Design," *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 2001): 36. http://www.proquest.com/. "operational design is the commander's tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and staff. The commander uses his operational design to visualize, describe, and direct those actions necessary to achieve his desired endstate and accomplish his assigned mission."
[32] David Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," *Survival* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07): 122, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf .
[33] IBID
[34] Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," 123.
[35] Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," 122.
[36] Schmitt, 9. Schmitt borrows the concept of "wicked problems" from Horst Rittel and Melvin Weber.
[37] Schmitt, 9.
[38] Schmitt, 1.
[39] Schmitt, 3.
[40] Schmitt, 11.
[41] Schmitt, 2.
[42] IBID
[43] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5*. 5-27.
[44] *Counterinsurgency, MCWP 3-33.5*. 4-6.
[45] IBID
[46] Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element, MCWP 3-16*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 28 November 2001), 4-1, http://usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCWP%203-16%20Fire%20Support%20Coordination%20in%20the%20Ground%20Combat%20Element.pdf (accessed February 16, 2009). "The division has the only formally structured targeting section with personnel specifically designated for targeting duties in the GCE. At regiment and below, personnel can be dedicated exclusively to targeting tasks only if the commander requests additional personnel or shifts individuals from their normal duties. Targeting at lower levels is usually done by FSCC and S-2section personnel without augmentation, but lower intelligence sections may be reinforced from division G-2 direct support teams."
[47] Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, COIN *Publication*, Chapter 1, page1.
[48] Not only is this alluded to multiple times throughout the this document, Colonel H. Stacy Clardy, CO RCT-2, described his role as the RCT Commander in this context to the author (a subordinate battalion Operations Officer) on numerous occasion in Iraq from September 2007-February 2008.
[49] Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Chapter Two, page 1: States that the Regimental AO consisted of an area of "30,000 square miles" bordering "the countries of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and included four points of entry"; The geography consisted of open desert and the Euphrates River Valley and contained an estimated population of "415,000 persons"; the RCT faced 2 major types of Sunni Insurgent groups: Nationalists and Extremist/Islamists, which were sub-divided into 6 sub-groups; Pg 2: "Because each [battalion] AO was had different insurgent groups with differing tactics, techniques, and procedures … it was often

necessary to treat each AO separately"; Pg-3: The AO consisted of 25 tribes; Pg 6: the RCT possessed TACON of 2 Iraqi Infantry Brigades; Pg 7: The RCT recruited and trained "2,556 IPs [Iraqi Police]".
[50] Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Chapter 3, Page 3.
[51] Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Chapter 3, Page 5.
[52] Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team-2, *COIN Publication*, Chapter 2, Page 2.
[53] Of the 14 Battalions contacted at least the Commanding Officer or Operations Officer from 9 USMC Battalions responded. 12 USMC Infantry Battalions and 2 USA Battalions were contacted. The author received no responses from USA Infantry Battalions.
[54] Response from Col James Parrington, USMC, to electronic questionnaire designed and emailed to Col Parrington by Major Gregory Jones.
[55] Response from LtCol James Donnellan, USMC, to electronic questionnaire designed and emailed to LtCol Donnellan by Major Gregory Jones.
[56] The questionnaire defined "kinetic" as: kinetic operations includes conventional and security operations and "non-kinetic" as: non-kinetic operations includes Civil Affairs, Support Operations, and operations in support of planning along Lines of Operation.
[57] Battalion Commander response to electronic questionnaire mailed by Major Gregory Jones.
[58] Response from Col James Parrington, USMC, to electronic questionnaire designed and emailed to Col Parrington by Major Gregory Jones.

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